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PUBLIC RIGHTS IN INDIANA WATERS*
G.

GRAHAM WAITEt

Lawyers use the term "public rights in water" to refer to those
water uses the law protects in persons regardless of whether they own
shoreline property fronting that portion of the watercourse proposed
to be used. The term "public" is a bit misleading. The persons exercising
the rights are for the most part private persons, just as are the persons
owning shoreline tracts; and the uses within the rights, though important
to society, are not more important than some shoreline uses. In some
states the rights have been court-created; are said to be held by the
state in trust for the public; and may be enforced by the state or private
persons.' Modem Indiana law pertaining to public uses of water, however,
is largely statutory. In the nineteenth century relevant decisions of the
state's courts invariably dealt with only commercial navigation. Not until
the 1940's did demands to make recreational uses of Indiana watercourses become sufficiently insistent to win governmental protection.
By that time it was toward the legislature that recreation pressures were
principally directed, rather than toward the courts through a test case.
This article summarizes the early case law of public rights in Indiana
water and then proceeds with the principal task of discussing the possible
meaning of recent statutory developments, none of which have been
construed by the Indiana Supreme Court.
CASE LAW

By 1900 several attitudes of Indiana's highest court toward public
rights in water had become clear. One such attitude is that the basis of
these rights is the common law.' The Indiana courts customarily have
'IAssociate Professor of Law, University of Buffalo School of Law.
1. See Waite, Public Rights to Use and Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958
Wis. L. r\v. 335.
2. Porter v. Allen, 8 Ind. 1 (1856) ; Depew v. Wabash & Erie Canal, 5 Ind. 8
(1854) ; Cox v. State, Blackf. (Ind.) 193, 198 (1833) (alternative ground of decision).
Early in the state's history there was some thought that public rights in water
sprang from article 4 of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 as reenacted by Congress,
1 Stat. 50 (1789). This article provides that "the navigable waters leading into the
Mississippi and the Saint Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, shall be
common highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of said territory as to
the citizens of the United States, and those of any States that may be admitted into
the confederacy, without any tax, impost, or duty therefor." In the Cox case, supra,
this provision was considered to limit the state's jurisdiction over streams so as to
prohibit obstructing them physically or levying any tax, impost or duty on navigation
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not used the trust doctrine8 in developing the case law of public rights in
water. The public right is expressed as an easement of passage, superior
to the riparians' title to the bed.4 The "public" to which the rights extend
is limited to the citizens of Indiana.5
Public rights in water are not paramount to every conflicting private
or public activity. The Indiana courts have tried to balance the interests
of the conflicting users in determining which use to protect and in what
degree.' Conflicting uses of land and water authorized by the state are
of them. Mention of the Ordinance was confined to dictum in the Depew case, supra,
twenty-one years later; and was omitted altogether a short time thereafter in Porter
v. Allen, sutra. This accords with the general shift in judicial thought in the 1840's
and 50's to the view that the Ordinance as reenacted was not intended to be operative
after a region attained statehood. See Note, 1939 Wis. L. REv. 547, 548-53 for a
discussion of the views courts have taken of the effect of the Northwest Ordinance
following attainment of statehood. Since 1833 only one Indiana decision sustaining public
rights in water has been grounded on the Congressional reenactment of the Northwest Ordinance. The case is Sherlock v. Bainbridge, 41 Ind. 35 (1872), where the Ordinance is cited for the Ohio River being a "common highway." The common law is then
relied on to determine the public rights in the stream. Talk of the Ordinance occurs
in a few other cases, notably Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257 (1867), in which the
public right is not sustained.
3. What is now known as the trust doctrine of public rights in navigable waters
stems from the following history as traced by Professor Richard S. Harnsberger of the
University of Nebraska Law School. In very early times the King of England was
said to own all tidal waters and the soils under them just as a private individual might.
There were no public rights. But the king was both a private person and a sovereign.
Eventually the law distinguished the king's water rights according to whether they
pertained to him as a private person or as a sovereign. Rights held by him as a private
individual were called the jus privatum; those held as sovereign, the jus pubflcum.
The king could do as he pleased with the jits privatum. The jus publicun, however,
was held in trust for the people and could not be transferred to private ownership. At
first navigation and its incidents were the only uses within the jus publicumn, and hence
were the only public rights, but at least since the Magna Charta fishing in tidal waters
has been included as well. All other rights to use the waters and the submerged beds,
such as to extract minerals, were in the jus privation. Although these rights, including
legal title to the beds, could be sold or given away by the king or-after 1702-by
Parliament, the grants were subject to the jus publiciom. The public rights could no more
be destroyed by the grantee of the private rights than they could by the king himself.
The public right of navigation, but not of fishing, eventually extended to nontidal
waters. See Harnsberger, The Present and Future Status of Public and Private Rights
in Wisconsin's Waters, (unpublished thesis in University of Wisconsin Law School
Library 1959) at 524-34.
In the leading United States Supreme Court case on the subject, Martin v. Waddell,
42 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), the jus privatum and jus publicumn were lumped together
and the government's disability to dispose was extended to the jus privatun. The Court
assumed that for waters in which public rights existed, every possible use of the soil of
the bed was included in the jus publicum.
4. Cox v. State, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 193, 198 (1833). The public easement does not
apply to Indiana riparians bordering on the Ohio River since the state boundary line is
the low water mark along the Indiana shore. Martin v. City of Evansville, 32 Ind. 85
(1869) ; Gentile v. State, 29 Ind. 409 (1868) ; Cowden v. Kerr, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) 280
(1842) ; Stinson v. Butler, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 285 (1837).
5. Lake Sand Co. v. State, 68 Ind. App. 439, 120 N.E. 714 (1918).
6. Williams v. Beardsley, 2 Ind. 591 (1851) (Bridge partially obstructing navigation
not a nuisance if the public benefit from the bridge was greater than the inconvenience
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likely to be allowed at the expense of the public rights.' Generally the
public rights in water do not limit riparian uses of the banks that do
not physically obstruct navigation,' nor may the public acquire rights to
use the shore by custom or prescription.' An exception to this is the
sailors' right to use the shore in emergencies arising in operation of
vessels.1" Also, shoreline businesses have been denied compensation for
profits lost through the mooring of commercial vessels nearby. 1
Indiana common law public rights to use navigable water include
the right of commercial navigation free of artificial obstructions placed by
it caused navigation). Compare Porter v. Allen, 8 Ind. 1 (1856), where the public right
of navigation is protected against obstructions placed by private persons in any part of
the river in which boats may in fact run, with Commissioners of St. Joseph County v.
Pidge, 5 Ind. 13 (1854), where the public right of navigation is protected against
obstructions placed 'by the state only to the extent they are placed in the navigable
channel. Nor need the state refrain from obstructing interstate navigable streams upstream from the point where it ceases to be used in commercial navigation. Neaderhouser v. The State, 28 Ind. 257 (1867).
The same theme of balancing various social interests appears in the Indiana definition of obstruction. The mere fact that some physical object is so placed that a certain
area of water surface may not be occupied by a vessel is not enough to cause the object
to be an obstruction in the legal sense. Rather the object must be such "an impediment
to the navigation that boats in passing along the stream could not, by the use of skill
and care, avoid being injured. . . ." Terre Haute Drawbridge Co. v. Halliday, 4 Ind.
36, 41 (1852). In this case it was declared to be a jury question as to whether a tree,
saw log and flat-boat lodged against a bridge pier and against which another flat-boat
foundered were obstructions. A description of water use rights Indiana recognizes by
virtue of owning the bank of a watercourse-so-called private rights in water-appears
in 32 IND. L. 3. 39 (1956). The note cites many Indiana cases and statutes on the
subject.
7. See Commissioners of St. Joseph County v. Pidge, 5 Ind. 13 (1854). The county
owned a bridge over a new channel created pursuant to state authorization. The county
was held not liable for obstructing navigation with the bridge when the river returned
to its old channel. See also Depew v. Wabash & Erie Canal, 5 Ind. 8 (1954) where the
state authorized a canal and laid out its route so as to cross a stream on which commercial navigation took place (although not by boats making interstate voyages). The
crossing was effected by an aqueduct that blocked navigation, but the canal company
was held not liable in damages. The result of the Depew case indicates that the public
right of navigation does not exist as against the state or its licensees in streams on
which no interstate commercial voyages occur, even though the stream is usable for
commercial navigation. The reason for this development appears to be the Indiana
court's concern for state control of state affairs and a desire to foster development
of the state's economy.
8. Martin v. City of Evansville, 32 Ind. 85 (1869). This case denied the right
of cities to prohibit construction of buildings on any wharf or shoreline of the Ohio
River above the high water mark, saying to do so would be a taking of property
requiring compensation, although the city need not pay compensation if it prohibited
construction of buildings below low water mark which tended to obstruct navigation.
The latent inference in the holding is that the public easement of navigation does not
limit the possible uses of riparian land, such as the providing of public access, so long
as a physical obstruction to navigation is not created.
9. Talbott v. Grace, 30 Ind. 389, 95 Am. Dec. 703 (1868) ; Bainbridge v. Sherlock,
29 Ind. 364 (1868) ; Clarke v. Evansville Boat Club, 44 Ind. App. 426, 88 N.E. 100 (1909).
10. Bainbridge v. Sherlock, 29 Ind. 364 (1868).
11. Sherlock v. Bainbridge, 41 Ind. 35 (1872).
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private persons anywhere in the stream where boats may in fact run,12
and free of permanent artificial obstructions placed by the state in the
navigable channel.1 3 They also include the right to remove sand from
Lake Michigan's bed' and probably from stream beds as well.' 5 The only
recreational use the courts have considered is fishing. The activity occurred on a non-navigable lake and therefore was not a public right, but
the inference is that it would have been had it occurred on a navigable
watercourse. 6 No public right to fish exists on a lake artificially created
from a non-navigable stream.'
The public right of navigation has figured in Indiana's efforts to
control water pollution. In a criminal prosecution for polluting a stream"
the defense was that the act was not committed in a public place. The
court found the stream was navigable and thus open to the public and the
defense was declared unsound.
In another case the public right of navigation was used by an upper
riparian dam owner to obtain the removal of a dam maintained by a
lower riparian. The down stream dam raised the water level at the foot
of the upstream dam and thereby decreased the capability of the upstream
dam to generate power. The upper riparian successfully argued that the
12. Porter v. Allen, 8 Ind. 1 (1856).
13. Commissioners of St. Joseph County v. Pidge, 5 Ind. 13 (1854).
14. Lake Sand Co. v. State, 68 Ind. App. 439, 120 N.E. 714 (1918). The court uses
the trust doctrine, discussed note 3 sup a, in this case, saying the state owns the bed of
Lake Michigan in trust for all state citizens and that all such citizens have correlative
rights to use the land.
15. State ex rel. Indiana Dept. of Conservation v. Kivett, 288 Ind. 623, 95 N.E.2d
145 (1950). The case does not clearly establish that removing sand from the bed of a
navigable stream is part of the public right. A state agency caused a riparian on the
White River to be enjoined from removing sand from the river without first obtaining
a permit from the state. The court rested its decision on a finding that the White River
was navigable for commercial purposes when Indiana became a state, and that the
riparian had no right to remove sand from it without a license. The opinion did not
cite the Lake Michigan case, Lake Sand Co., note 14 supra, nor did it cite IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 27-620-26 (Burns 1960), which declares the natural resources, including minerals
under public lakes, to be a public right Nor was anything said of a public right to
remove sand. The court did quote from a case saying the state owns the bed in its
"sovereign" capacity, State ex reL. Indiana Dept. of Conservation v. Kivett, 228 Ind.
623, 637, 95 N.E.2d 145, 152 (1950). While this language suggests public rights, there
is no indication that the court meant that title is part of the jus publicunm. See note
3 supra. Rather, the court seems to consider the state to own the beds just as a private
individual owns something and hence can do with them as it likes. This makes it seem
that the state's requirement of a license is justified simply because the state may do
what it pleases with its own property rather than because licensing may insure that one
person does not monopolize the public right and that the individual's use confers some
benefit in revenue on the nonusing public. Since case and statutory law make the
extraction of sand from beds of navigable lakes a public right, it seems desirable
that extraction of sand from beds of navigable streams be a public right also.
16. Sanders v. De Rose, 207 Ind. 90, 191 N.E. 331 (1934).
17. Patton Park, Inc. v. Pollak, 115 Ind. App. 32, 55 N.E.2d 328 (1944).
18. State v. Wabash Paper Co., 21 Ind. App. 157, 51 N.E. 949 (1898).
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loss in power generating capacity amounted to special damages allowing
him to sue to remove the downstream dam as a public nuisance because
it obstructed navigation."
Although no discussion of the test of navigability appears in the
Indiana cases until the State ex rel. Iuliauz Dept. of Conservation v.
Kivett ' decision in 1950, it is evident from earlier cases that the test
applied is the susceptibility of the watercourse to commercial navigation
by substantial vessels in 1816 when Indiana became a state.2 '
STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS

Indiana statutes before 1920 reveal little statewide policy toward
water resources. These early statutes were usually either prohibitions
apparently intended to protect waterways as a means of transport,22
permissions to local units of government to improve waterways for
purposes of transport,23 or authorizations permitting drainage, flood protection and fixing of lake levels. 24 Although these statutes gave incidental
protection to public rights through their tendency to maintain the
navigability and purity of the water, they did not affect the definition
of the waters on which public rights may be exercised, nor did they delineate the activities which are included as being within the public rights.
19.

Bissell Chilled Plow Works v. South Bend Mfg. Co., 64 Ind. App. 1, 22-23, 111

N.E. 932, 938-39 (1916).
20. 228 Ind. 623, 95 N.E.2d 145 (1950).
21. See Neaderhouser v. State, 28 Ind. 257 (1867) ; John Hilt Lake Ice Co. v. Zahrt,
29 Ind. App. 476, 62 N.E. 509 (1902) (Lake 1 and % miles long and 1 mile wide, held
navigable) ; Sanders v. De Rose, 207 Ind. 90, 191 N.E. 331 (1934) (Lake non-navigable
although boat livery maintained thereon).
22. E.g., obstruction or diversion of navigable waters was made a public nuisance,
IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2502 (Burns 1956) ; criminal offenses were established for conduct
such as creating stagnant water, IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2504 (Burns 1956) ; putting dead
animals into a watercourse, INn. ANN. STAT. § 10-2505 (Burns 1956); obstructing a
public canal or injuring it, IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2601 (Burns 1956); and dumping
rubbish in any lake or stream, IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2605a (Burns 1956). Other examples are found in IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-2606-18 (Burns 1956) ; and IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 10-2620 (Burns 1956).
23. E.g., county Boards of Commissioners were empowered to use county money to
maintain any canal used for navigation, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 26-1413-14 (Burns 1960) ;
the county commissioners were authorized to change or straighten watercourses and to
pay the costs by special assessments, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 26-1401-06 (Burns 1960);
a 1905 Act "concerning highways," IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 68-101-03 (Burns 1961), authorized the county commissioners to declare a stream navigable and to keep it clear of
obstruction by calling out "for two days inhabitants . . . liable to work on the public
highways .... "
24. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 27-601-06 (Burns 1960) (lake levels); IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 27-801-15 (Burns 1960) (drainage) repealing an earlier drainage law (Ind. Acts
1905, ch. 157) but preserving the 1905 lake level law. Under these acts persons desiring
improvements in drainage and flood protection instituted ex parte proceedings in court
leading to the making of the improvements -by private initiative. This approach and
method was continued in a 1933 act, Ian. ANN. STAT. §§ 27-101-321 (Burns 1960).
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Efforts to decide some issues of water use on a statewide basis have
been made25 since the creation in 1919 of a state Department of Conservation.2" In 1947 the legislature made its first important declarations
of activities which may be included as being within the public rights to use
water, 7 and eight years later the legislature seemingly expanded the
waters in which public rights obtain.2" The possible meaning of the latter
statute will be discussed first.
A.

Useful Natural Watercourses Declared Public

In 1955 water in any natural lake or other natural body of water
which could be applied to "any useful and beneficial purpose" was dedared to be a natural resource and public water of the state.2" As such it
is subject to legislative control and regulation for the public welfare."0
Is recreational use of water a useful and beneficial purpose? The
statute's preamble lists recreational use in a list of increased water uses
making the legislation necessary."' Factually, the social value of water
recreation makes it likely that this recreational use would be deemed
beneficial especially because many of the waters affected by the statute
are actually devoted to recreational uses.
Specific controls over public water are left to future legislation and
administrative action. The effectiveness of the pressure for protection
of recreation existing at the time specific controls are promulgated will
largely determine the amount of protection that recreational uses ultimately receive. In the meantime, Chapter 301 of the 1947 Acts 32 (dis-

cussed infra) lends support to treating many, if not all, recreational uses
of public fresh water lakes as "beneficial" uses.
25. INn. ANN. STAT. § 68-201 (Burns 1961) (created Indiana Deep Waterways
Commission to connect the Great Lakes with the Atlantic Ocean); IND. ANN. ST.T.
§§ 68-301-05, 401-05 (Bums 1961) (Indiana participated with Illinois in interstate
activities relating to water) ; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 11-1301-1813 (Bums 1956) (revises
fish and game laws); IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-736 (Burns 1961) and IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 27-819, 822-23, 828 (Bums 1960) (authorization of state and local cooperation with
federal government on flood control problems).
26. IND. ANN. STAT. §3 60-704, 729 (Bums 1961).
27. IN . ANN. STAT. §§ 27-620-26, 654-58 (Bums 1960). Of lesser importance are
IND. ANN. STAT §§ 27-614-19, 627-28 (Bums 1960). With regard to §§ 27-614-19, see
text related to notes 42, 43, 45 and 46 infra. As to §§ 27-627-28, see text related to note
49 infra.
28. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 27-1401-08 (Burns 1960).
29. INn. ANN. STAT. § 27-1402 (Burns 1960).
30. Ibid. Furthermore, new or increased artificial uses of water are subject to
future regulation by the legislature. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1405 (Bums 1960).
31. Notes to IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1401 (Bums 1960) quote the preamble of the
statute. In pertinent part it reads, "Whereas, Due to the vastly increased use of water
for domestic, agricultural, industrial, recreational and related purposes. ..
"
32. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 27-620-26 (Bums 1960), as amended, IND. ANN. STAT. 33
27-621, 23 (Burns Supp. 1961).
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The statute under discussion does affect public substantive rights
in water in one respect. The section declaring the state's power to control
public waters is followed by one subordinating "all" water uses, including, presumably, the public ones, to the riparians' use "for domestic
purposes, which shall include, but not be limited to water for household
purposes, drinking water for livestock, poultry and domestic animals." 3
This provision is distinctive in its preference of a private use over public
uses of water.
The public right of navigation appears to be further subordinated
to private development through statutory authorization to riparians to
impound water by building dams in the natural stream bed or by diverting
the water to a reservoir."' However, the impoundment may occur only
when the stream flow or lake level exceeds "existing reasonable uses,"
and any obstruction placed across the stream must include an outlet for
releasing water the owner is not entitled to use.3" Also, the riparian's
actions must first be approved by the state's Flood Control and Water
Resources Commission"
It thus appears that the only respects in
which public rights take a back seat are in the supplying of riparians'
domestic needs and in the building of impounding structures. Such structures necessarily impede navigation to some extent, but if the structure
is a dam, the net effect may be beneficial to navigation via a deepening
of the water upstream from the dam.
In some respects the statute seems to contemplate a balancing of the
proposed riparian uses against the public and other "existing reasonable
uses." If it is decided that a proposed riparian use is more desirable than a
public use, the proposed use may be authorized even though it obliterates
the public use by declaring the public use to be unreasonable. An interesting provision of the statute gives the right to use additional stream
volumes created by release from impoundments to the riparians who
built and financed the impoundments, and the provision explicitly states
that other riparians have no rights in flowage beyond normal stream
flow." Thus, the impounding riparian need not fear that by increasing
the volume temporarily he will have incurred an obligation to other
riparians or the public to continue the increased volume permanently.
A 1959 amendment to the statute furthers the impression that conflicts in water use rights, public or private, are to be resolved by balancing
33. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1403(1) (Burns 1960).
34. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1403(2) (Burns 1960). IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-620
(Burns 1960) says that the public holds "vested rights" in fresh water lakes. This has
been qualified by the domestic use priority mentioned in the text.
35. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1403(2) (Burns 1960).

36. Ibid.
37. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1403(3) (Burns 1960).
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the utility and social cost of the various uses against one another. The
amendment provides that disputes between users of surface water in
any watershed may be mediated by the Flood Control and Water Resources Commission at the request of any party to the dispute. The
Commission is directed to conduct a public hearing to consider the facts
involved, after it has first notified all interested parties of the time and
place at which the hearing is to be held. The Commission may survey
the water supply in the watershed and try to add to the sources of water
for users in the watershed. However, the Commission's recommendations
are not binding on the parties and do not preclude resort to the courts."8
It is probable that a court desiring to fulfill the spirit of the legislation
would resolve disputes between users of surface waters by use of the
same balancing technique mentioned above.
B.

Protection of Lakes

Public rights to use water have indirectly been enhanced by the
legislature through statutes protecting Indiana watercourses from various
physical hazards. Drainage ditches may not be dug through a lake, or
within 160 rods of it so as to lower its legally established level, if the
lake is at least ten acres large. 9 Where the water level of a lake with
surface area greater than twenty acres is controlled by a dam or other
device, it is unlawful to lower the water level by more than twelve inches
below the high water mark established by the dam or other device creating
the lake.4" The statute does not apply, however, to artificial lakes created
or used in connection with providing a municipal water supply, or with
generating electricity, or with storing water for such purposes nor to
Lake Michigan or lakes owned or controlled by the State Conservation
Department.4
The Conservation Department decides whether a proposed ditch will
lower a lake's level. Upon an affirmative finding, the Department then
38. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1406(1), (2), (3) (Burns 1960). Subsection (3)
requires persons using ground or surface water to report the amount used when asked
to do so by the state flood control commission. Subsection (1) authorizes nonriparians
as well as riparians to divert floodwaters for any useful purpose if the diversion will
not harm other users of the water or landowners, and if the state flood control and
water resources commission approves of the diversion. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1407
(Bums 1960) defines floodwaters as water flowing or standing above or outside the
banks of the watercourse. The above subsections have little direct affect on public
rights in water.
39. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-601 (Burns 1960), as construed by Holle v. Drudge, 190
Ind. 520, 129 N.E. 229 (1920). IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 27-614-19 (Burns 1960) provide
procedures whereby the State Conservation Department is to make sure that devices are
installed to protect lake levels from being lowered by drainage ditches.
40. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-610 (Burns 1960).
41. IND. ANN.

STAT.

§ 27-611 (Burns 1960).
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determines the safeguard to be constructed to prevent the level from
dropping. The problem of who has standing to challenge the Department's decision on these questions is not decisively answered. The statute
states that "any person . . . who may be adversely affected by" the

Department's decision may appeal to the courts." The statute requires
the complaint to state the interest of the appealing party "whether he be
a person proposing to construct . . . a ditch or drain on his own land or

whether he be a petitioner or other party or public officer in a pending
drainage proceedings. .

.

. ""

This might be construed to mean that

only persons in these categories have standing to appeal to the courts.
However, another act passed the same year declared the natural resources
and natural scenic beauty of Indiana to be a public right and that the
public of Indiana has "a vested right in the preservation, protection and
enjoyment of all the public fresh water lakes, of Indiana in their present
state, and the use of such waters for recreational purposes."44 The fact
that "any person" who is adversely affected thereby is enabled to appeal
the Conservation Department's decision, plus the fact that an act of the
same year gives the Indiana public a vested right in the preservation
of the lakes "in their present state," indicates the reasonable interpretation
of the appeal statute to be that an individual sportsman may take such an
appeal. However, there has been no judicial construction of either
statute to date.
A person does not have to be planning his own ditch or to be a
party to a drainage proceeding in order to intervene in a court proceeding
that someone else has brought.4" Thus, it seems that any member of the
public may intervene.4"
Written approval from the Conservation Department is necessary to
encroach on the lake level or shoreline of any public lake by excavating
or filling or otherwise changing the size or affecting the natural resources or scenic beauty of the lake or by changing the contour of the
lake below the shoreline. 7 The Department has authority to sue in the
state courts to preserve the lakes and streams." Whether this is authority
42. IND. ANN.
43. Ibid.

44.
45.
46.

STAT.

§ 27-615 (Burns 1960).

IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-620 (Burns 1960).
IND. ANN. STAT. §27-615 (Burns 1960).
IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-615 (Burns 1960)

requires an intervenor to be "inter-

ested in or affected by" the proposed ditch. It would seem this requirement is satisfied
since IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-620 (Burns 1960) gives all the public of Indiana a "vested
right" in the preservation and enjoyment of the lakes. Any member of the public is
affected by the Conservation Department's decision, whether the individual member
is a sportsman or sightseer or not.
47. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-623 (Burns Supp. 1961).
48. IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-748 (Burns 1961).
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to protect aesthetics generally or just the water level is difficult to determine. There have been no actions brought under the statute.
The Conservation Department has authority to have established by
legal action the average normal water level of all the state's lakes, including artificial ones, and to build dams or other works necessary to
maintain such level.4" Another statute allows petition by 20 per cent of
the owners of land abutting or lying within 440 yards of a lake of at
least 10 acres, or by the Department of Conservation or County Board of
Commissioners to a Circuit or Superior Court, to fix, change or maintain
the lake level. "° The petitioners are to state the type of work they desire,
such as the construction or repair of a dam, and the lake level desired. "
The statute does not restrict the type of improvement that may be
constructed, except that any improvement must be beneficial to the public
good. The provision for apportionment of costs of such projects indicates
that projects beneficial to the state as a whole as well as projects of value
predominantly to landowners near the lake are within the contemplation
of the legislature. If only the landowners petition for the improvement,
they alone pay for it, in proportion to the benefit each tract receives from
the improvement. If the county or the Indiana Conservation Department
joins in the landowners' petition, or if the petition is solely that of the
Conservation Department or the county, only one-quarter of the cost
is to be borne by the landowners whose tracts are within a quarter mile
of the lake. Another quarter is to be borne by the county and one-half
by the Conservation Department. "2 At the same time, local owners can
defeat the plans of their own clan as well as the plans of outsiders. If
51 per cent of the landowners object to an improvement within ten days
of its hearing, the petition will be dismissed. 3 Thus, the statute strives
to counter the interest of the nonresident sportsman who desires additional
sites for water recreation and improvement of existing ones with the
realization that the sites will in part be paid for with public money.
Assurance that the local residents will not be cavalierly treated is provided
by the veto power of 51 per cent of the local landowners.
C. Public Rights in Lakes
1. Chapter3o: A 1947 Statute DeclaringPublicRights Broadly."
The statute declaring natural resources and scenic beauty to be a public
49.
50.

51.
appears
52.
53.
54.

IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-627 (Burns 1960).
IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-629 (Burns 1960).
INn. ANN. STAT. § 27-630 (Burns 1960). The procedure to be followed
in IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 27-629-53 (Burns 1960).
IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-636 (Burns 1960).
IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-634 (Burns 1960).
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 27-620-26 (Burns 1960), as amended, IND. ANN. STAT. §§

27-621, 23 (Burns Supp. 1961).
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right, Chapter 301, 1947 Acts, indicates that recreational activities on
lakes and the extraction of minerals from lakes are part of the public
right. The public is said to have a "vested" right in preservation and
enjoyment of the lakes and in the use of the water for recreation."5 This
sounds like a property right, and the remedies stated in the statute accord
with this view. It is probably not, however, a property right as against
the state." "Natural resources" are defined to mean "the water, fish,
plant life and minerals,"" and the natural inference would seem to be
that the public's right in these resources is to use them. "Natural scenic
beauty" is defined to mean "the natural condition as left by nature without
man-made additions or alterations.""8
Does this statute provide a means whereby a member of the public
could obtain an injunction abating an eyesore such as a garish billboard
or a run-down house? The answer is not clear. Another section of the
statute may be interpreted as saying that it does so provide and that
damages may be awarded as well. 9 However, the only positive sanction
of the statute is directed against encroachment on the water level or shoreline."0 Hence it may be argued that conduct not affecting these two
matters is not within the operation of the statute. The sweeping language
in which the public right is declared suggests that the legislature intended
a more liberal construction of the statute. In any event, issuance of
an injunction would be discretionary with the court, in the equity tradition.
If damages are to be awarded, how are they to be measured? And
if it is a public right being vindicated, how are those members of the
public to be compensated who do not join in the suit? Perhaps the most
effective and theoretically just remedy is to award only special damages
to a private litigant, in the amount of those costs he can prove to have
incurred himself as a result of the destruction of scenic beauty, and reserve
for an action brought by the state the awarding of general damages for
the destruction of beauty. At the present, one can only speculate as to
such remedies, there having been no cases brought to vindicate the right.
Apart from civil remedies, there is a criminal penalty of a fine of $100
to $500 imposed on any violator of the statute for each offense. 6
a. Public Rights Not Made to Depend on Navigability. Navigability is not the test of the lakes to which the public rights declared by
55.

IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-620 (Burns 1960).
56. See discussion in text following note 76 infra.
57. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-621 (Bums Supp. 1961).

58. Ibid.
59.

60.

61.

IND. ANN. STAT.
IND. ANN. STAT.
INn. ANN. STAT.

§ 27-624 (Bums 1960).

§ 27-623 (Bums Supp. 1961).
§ 27-625 (Burns 1960).
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the statute attach. Rather the test is that the lakes "have been used by
the public with the acquiescence of all riparian owners," except that the
statutory rights do not exist in Lake Michigan or in lakes lying wholly
or partially within the corporate limits of cities of the second class in
counties of between 400,000 and 650,000 population. 2 In those lakes
that are navigable but which do not meet the public use-riparian
acquiescence test, it seems only the common law rights obtain. Certainly
this is true of streams, since the statute purports only to affect lakes.
Will a court, should the case arise, expand the common law rights to
include those conferred by statute? One factor tending to decrease the
chances of judicial expansion as to lakes should probably be given little
weight. Prior to 1961 the statute defined public lakes more broadly than
now. Instead of acquiescence by "all" riparians in a public use,
acquiescence by "any" was sufficient.6" The result, if the amendment be
taken literally, is to greatly reduce the number of lakes to which the
expansion of public rights afforded by the statute applies. It might be
argued from this that the legislature had decided its expansion of public
rights had originally applied to too many lakes. Implicit in such a
decision is a further decision that the expanded public rights should not
exist on lakes falling within the original definition but outside the
amended one. From this it would follow that the courts, in order to carry
out the legislative policy, should not expand the common law public
rights existing on those lakes.
Before accepting this line of argument, however, the courts should
consider the impact of the amendment on the substantive rights the
statute gives the public on those lakes to which the statute applies. By
requiring all riparians to acquiesce in public use to make a lake public
the amendment narrows the expansion of public rights affected by the
statute down to this: acquiescence by all riparians to one type of public
use-fishing, for example-authorizes for an indefinite time other types
of public use-swimming and waterskiing, for instance-and the number
of non-riparians that may rightfully be using the lake at one time is
unlimited. In other respects the statute comes close to allowing the public
to use the lakes that all the riparians are willing to allow them to use.
In addition, of course, they still have the judge made rights in navigable
waters. Such a construction of the definition of public fresh water lakes
is at odds with the spirit of the language declaring the natural resources
and natural scenic beauty of Indiana a public right and declaring a vested
62. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-621 (Burns Supp. 1961). A compiler's note to this
section in Burns states that only Lake county has such a population. Lake county
borders Lake Michigan and contains Gary and Hammond.

63. Ind. Acts. 1947, ch. 301 § 2.
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right in the public to use public lakes for recreation.6 It is unlikely that
the legislature intended to reduce thd bold promise of this language to a
mockery by cute definition of public lakes, especially in light of the rising
demand for public use of water.
It is difficult to determine just what the legislature did intend the
amendment to accomplish. This writer's guess is that the legislature
realized that the original wording of the statute could be construed to
cause a lake to be public if one riparian allowed a non-riparian to use the
lake one time, and that the amendment was passed simply to avoid such
an extreme result. Perhaps the legislature will clarify the situation by
further amendment. In the meantime, the inconsistencies of the statute
seem so great that the Indiana courts should be slow in drawing any conclusions from it bearing on the wisdom of judicial expansion of public
rights on streams or on lakes outside the statute. Of greater significance
for a court deciding whether to expand public rights in water is the
finding in 1956 of the Indiana Water Resources Study Committee that
"recreational uses of streams and lakes, or reservoirs-whether natural
or man-made-should be broadened greatly where practicable."6
2. Chapter 8x: Another 1947 Statute Declaring Broad Public
Rights.6 Perhaps the strongest statutory language bearing on public
enjoyment of Indiana lakes appears in Chapter 181, 1947 Acts:
The state of Indiana is hereby vested with full power and control of all of the public fresh water lakes in the state of Indiana
both meandered and unmeandered and the state of Indiana
shall hold and control all of said lakes in trust for the use of all
of its citizens for fishing, boating, swimming, the storage of
water to maintain water levels, and for any purposes for which
said lakes are ordinarily used and adapted, and no person
owning lands bordering any such lakes shall have the exclusive
right to the use of waters of any such lake or any part thereof.6
The act makes it unlawful to extend the shoreline of public fresh
water lakes by filling, except as permitted by the Conservation Department, and prevents title from vesting in the riparian owner by accretion
if the water is artificially caused to recede by drainage or by extending
64. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-620 (Burns 1960). Perhaps "all" should be construed
to mean "any." See discussion in text infra of meaning of comparable language in
statutes cited note 72 infra.

65. See Indiana Water Resources and Indiana. Water Resources: Technical
Appendix (1956).
66. IND. ANN. STAT. :§ 27-654-58 (Burns 1960), as amended, IND. ANN. STAT §
27-656 (Burns Supp. 1961).
67. IND. ANN. STAT. :27-654 (Burns 1960).
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the shore line out into the waters by filling with soil or any other substance.8 The act defines "water lin&or shore line" to be the line formed
on the bank or shore by the water surface at the legally established average
normal level. If no such level has been established, then the average
level determined by existing water level records is used. If no records are
available, then the waterline is the line formed by the action of the water
marking the soil of the bed with a character and vegetation distinct from
that of the banks."9 "Public fresh water lake" is defined as any lake
which has been used by any or all riparian owners, except Lake Michigan
and lakes lying wholly or partially within the corporate limits of cities
of the second class in counties of between 400,000 and 650,000 population.7" The statute does not apply to streams.
a. Interpretationaland Constitutional Problems. Several features
of the above statute deserve comment. First, as in Chapter 301, the
natural resource-scenic beauty statute,71 the navigability concept does not
figure in determining the lakes in which the public rights attach. But the
test for identifying public lakes is not the same as that created in the
natural resource-scenic beauty statute. In the statute here considered
acquiescence of "any or all" riparians to public use makes the lake public,
whereas in the other statute "all" riparians must acquiesce to the public
use. Originally the definitions were the same in this respect and both
spoke of acquiescence by "any" riparian in public use.72 Why introduce
divergence between them later? Both definitions were changed in the
same session of the legislature and the portion of the new definitions
excepting Lake Michigan and lakes within certain cities is identical in
each statute. These circumstances suggest a legislative intent that the
new definitions be identical. This suggestion is strengthened by the fact
that the original definition of public lakes in chapter 181 differed from
that in chapter 301 in that the chapter 181 definition excepted no lakes
from its purview whereas the chapter 301 definition did make such an
exception." These factors seem to indicate an attempt to make the two
statutes identical in their definition of public fresh water lakes. Therefore, the difference of one statute requiring acquiescence by "all"
riparians while the other requires acquiescence by "any or all" must be
inadvertent. But which requirement is the one the legislature intended
to apply?
68. IND.
69. IND.

ANN. STAT.
ANN. STAT.

§ 27-655 (Burns 1960).
§ 27-656 (Burns Supp. 1961).

70. Ibid.
71. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 27-620-26 (Burns 1960), as amended, IND. ANN.
27-621, 23 (Burns Supp. 1961).
72. Ind. Acts. 1947, ch. 181, § 3; Ind. Acts. 1947, ch. 301, § 2.
73.

Compare the two acts cited note 72 supra.
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Before suggesting an answer to the question just posed, a second
question should be raised. How much use by the public, if such use is
appropriately acquiesced in, is enough to make a lake public? Apparently
any use by the public is sufficient. Does this mean that one swim, sail,
fishing trip or the like by one member of the public is enough? No court
decision has construed the statute. The use would have to be known of by
the person or persons whose acquiescence was critical, since acquiescence is
a conscious decision not to protest rather than a lack of knowledge of
anything about which to protest. 4 Although it seems extreme to shift
the status of a lake from private to public on the basis of one use by one
member of the public acquiesced in by one riparian, it is not clear how
much more use the legislature intended to require. Use for a period
equal to that necessary to acquire a prescriptive right probably is excessive. The statute does not appear to create property rights in the public7 5
but speaks in terms of police power. Its title reads: "An act declaring
and determining the right and authority of the state of Indiana to
control .

. .

the water in all public fresh water lakes. . .

.,,"

The key to these two problems in statutory interpretation may lie in
a constitutional problem the statutes pose. Assuming that the statutes
are police regulations, they are unconstitutional if they arbitrarily classify
the lakes as public or private and thereby deny lake shore owners the
equal protection of the laws required by the United States Constitution.7
The basis of classification is the acquiescence of a given lakes ripariansor perhaps the acquiescence of only one of their number-in public use
of the lake. This test seems to bear only a remote relationship to the
social need for more watercourses for public recreation, which must be
the ultimate justification for the Indiana statutes creating more public
waters. Of course the fact that a nonriparian used a lake is in itself some
evidence of existing demand for public use of the lake. This suggests
the statutes could be sustained on constitutional grounds if the public use
in which a riparian must acquiesce is construed to be "substantial" public
use. This would promote rational classification of the lakes, since for
each lake made public there would be a demonstrated demand for its public
use. But what reasonable purpose is served by requiring riparian
acquiescence before making a lake public? It might be argued that if all
74. See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTioNARY,2d ed., at 23.
75. Some indication of this is found in the statute's language which vests "full
power and control" of the affected lakes, and not their "title," in the state. The state is
to "hold and control" all of the lakes "in trust for the use of all its citizens . . . for
any purposes for which said lakes are ordinarily used and adapted." IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 27-654 (Burns 1960).
76. Note to IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-654 (Burns 1960). [Emphasis added.]

77. U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV, § 1.
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lakes for which there is significant demand for public use are not made
public the statute still is unconstitutional. This argument ignores that a
lake's capacity to support use beyond that of its riparians and their guests
also is pertinent to deciding that it should be thrown open to public use.
Such matters as a lake's size, shape and depth bear on its suitability for
waterskiing; the characteristic of its bottom being mud or sand affects
its suitability for fishing and swimming; the purity of its water is relevant
to its suitability for all recreational uses. Requiring riparian acquiescence
in public use gives some rough protection against over-use of a lake on the
theory that if there already are too many fishermen or other sportsmen
using a lake, no riparian will acquiesce in public use. If a riparian does
acquiesce then it must not be generally agreed that the lake is overused,
and in such case the legislature may reasonably deem it a public lake.
The constitutional requirement that the statutes set up a reasonable
classification of lakes strongly suggests that the question of how much
public use of a lake will make the lake public should be answered "substantial use." But this requirement would be met equally well by requiring
acquiescence of "all" riparians rather than of "any or all." Examination
of the statutes themselves shows the acquiescence required is that of
"any" riparian. "Any or all," being in the alternative, appears to create
no change from the earlier "any" and therefore should be construed
simply to mean "any." "All," since it drastically restricts the application
of the statute, is inconsistent with the strong language in Chapter 181.
"Any" avoids frustrating the apparent legislative intent to enlarge public
rights and also is consistent with a constitutional interpretation of the
statute.78
Public use sufficient to make the lake public results in the public
having a right to use the lake for any purpose for which it is ordinarily
used and adopted, rather than just a right to use it in the fashion of the
initial use (as would be the case if only strict prescriptive property rights
could be acquired). Since the right of public use stems from the police
power, the public has no vested right as against the state. Hence a member
of the public cannot object if the right is withdrawn or altered unless
unusual circumstances of reliance are present. This situation is similar
to the right to rely on the continuation of existing zoning regulations.
But is not this position inconsistent with the statute previously discussed
which is suggested as giving the public a vested right? It would seem not.
The latter statute can either be narrowly construed as applying only to
encroachments on the shoreline or, and this seems the better view, the
statute can be construed as giving the public a vested right against
78.

The classification rationale described in the text seemingly meets the situation
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private encroachments on public rights, but not against public encroachments. The rights are to be enforced by the Conservation Department
through suits for injunction."'
The fact that the theory of police power statutes is regulation
reduces the chance that the courts would find in the designation of a
lake as public a taking of riparians' property requiring compensation.
The basic task of the lawyer attempting to get a court to uphold statutes
like those under discussion, which impinge on private rights without
compensating the owners thereof, is to convince the court that the facts
giving rise to the regulation make compensation inappropriate. Lawyers
often, because of the police power language of a statute, adopt a "no
compensation" frame of mind when approaching such a task.
The courts may be more likely to require compensation of riparians
situated on nonnavigable lakes than of those located on navigable ones,
since this involves creation of public rights where none previously existed
rather than mere expansion of present rights. The feeling might be that
the substantial harm to the riparian is in allowing the public to use the
lake at all, not in expanding the permitted public uses. Resting the
statutory right on the police power promotes flexible administration of
public rights since the state has no public trust responsibility. Police
power theory offers another advantage in that it avoids questions of the
state's power to create a property interest in the public in lakes not
navigable by the federal test and hence never within state ownership."
At the same time it gives the public the same rights of use that ownership gives. A major drawback of creating rights by legislative act rather
than judicial decision, whether the statute is a police regulation or confers
a property right, is the relative ease with which the statute may be changed
and the rights withdrawn, perhaps inadvertently. This is illustrated by
the amendments to chapters 181 and 301 already discussed.
b. Zonihzg Lakes for Public Use. The preamble of this statute
deserves attention also. It states there are privately owned fractional
tracts of land bordering on, and parts of which are submerged by, certain
lakes and rivers; that certain owners of such lakeshore land claim the
fee under the water to the line of the government survey; that throughout
the history of the state its people have used the water above such
submerged lands for boating, fishing, swimming, and for all of the
usual and ordinary purposes "and in the same manner and as fully as
other parts of such bodies of water have been used" without objection
where all riparians to a lake except one emphatically do not acquiesce in the public use.
79. 1 ND. ANN. STAT. § 27-657 (Burns 1960).
80. See Vaite, Pleasure Boating in. a Federal Union, 10 BuFF. L. R~v. 427, 430-38

(1961).
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from persons "who have owned lands contiguous to such submerged
portions of land, subject to the prior rights of public user of the lake
waters thereon. . .

.,,s

This language is puzzling. Until one gets to the part about prior
rights of public user, it seems that the legislature is acknowledging that
certain lakes were never susceptible to commercial navigation in the
traditional sense of that term and therefore title to the beds passed to the
shoreline patentees from the United States82 and, since susceptibility to
commercial navigation is also the test Indiana uses to determine whether
common-law public rights attach to a watercourse, 3 the title of these
shoreline owners has thus never been subject to any public rights of use.
At the same time, the legislature seems to be saying, the public has always
used the water in various ways just as though public rights did attach.
The reference to using the waters as fully "as other parts" of the lakes
in question inconsistently suggests that portions of the lakes are commercially navigable and that common-law public rights, other than commercial navigation, attach only to those portions of the watercourses. 4
In view of the history of public use with riparian acquiescence of nonnavigable lakes and of nonnavigable portions of navigable lakes, the act
is passed to give the public a right to make such use, and this is done
without disturbing the riparian's title to the bed. The act is in the nature
of a zoning of the lakes to public use.
But what of the statement that the ownership of the lakeshore is
"subject to the prior rights of public user of the lake waters thereon"?
There can be prior rights of public user only if the lakes are navigable
in the "public rights" sense, which in Indiana means "navigability in the
bed-title" sense. Hence the beds, if the lakes are navigable, would be
owned by the state, not by riparians s5 It may be that the state acquired
the shoreland at some time in the past and resold it with the intention
of conveying title to the bed. 'There is no reason why this couldn't be
done, although there is no evidence it ever happened. Even in a state
following the trust concept of public rights in water, state sale of a bed
would be possible if ownership of the bed were not confused with the
sovereign power to control the use of the bed and of the water as well."0
81. Note to IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-654 (Burns 1960).
82. John Hilt Lake Ice Co. v. Zahrt, 29 Ind. App. 476, 62 N.E. 509 (1902).
83. See note 21 supra.
84. There is no Indiana case to the contrary, although where commercial navigation was involved the Indiana Supreme Court decided that a private individual riparian
must refrain from obstructing all parts of the river where boats could run in periods
of high water, not just the part where they usually sailed. Porter v. Allen, 8 Ind.
1 (1856).
85. See note 80 supra. Also see note 21 supra and related text.
86. See note 3 supra.
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If the common-law public rights are taken to include only commercial
navigation, 7 the language of the preamble is explained. It prefaces an
act that will expand the public right to include additional uses without
disturbing private ownership of the bed. The preamble refers to the
conditions it describes as existing on "certain" lakes, thus implying that
on others they do not. This is consistent with the possibility that they
exist only where the state once owned the shore and sold it intending
to convey the fee to the lake bed as well.
D.

MiscellaneousProtections

Since 1905 the commissioners of any county have been empowered
to declare any watercourse in their county navigable on petition of twentyfour freeholders. 8 Declaring a stream navigable under this statute does
not protect it from obstruction by the state itself, 9 but it does protect the
stream from blocking by private individuals" and also places the watercourse under the care of the supervisor of the road district through which
it passes. This may result in some rudimentary maintenance work on the
stream, such as the removal of obstructions to navigation, as the supervisor is empowered to call out the district's inhabitants for two days'
work on the stream each year.91 It is not known how often this statute
is invoked, but the frequency is presumably slight. It may, however,
afford a more practicable remedy than injunction for channel obstruction
in cases where navigation by pleasure boat is restricted to a narrow,
tortuous channel.
The Board of Town Trustees is empowered to "survey, determine,
regulate and care for" the shores and wharves of any stream within the
corporate limits. 2 Would an ordinance requiring shoreland owners to
allow the public access to the water be a regulation of the shore within
the meaning of the act? There is no decision on this point. If the individuals exercising the right of access so created were liable to pay for
the actual damage they might cause to riparian land, the due process
risk of such an ordinance would seemingly be greatly lessened.
Regardless of whether Indiana communities have the means to provide public access to a watercourse without paying for it, they can always
87. This would be consistent with the English view as to nontidal waters. See
note 6 supra.
88. IND. ANN. STAT. § 68-101 (Burns 1961).
89. Depew v. Wabash & Erie Canal, 5 Ind. 8 (1854). See textual discussion following note 11 supra.
90. IND. ANN. STAT. § 68-104 (Burns 1961) renders a private obstructor liable
to the same penalties incurred by obstructors of public highways. One such panalty is a
$10-$100 fine. IND. ANN. STAT. § 36-2903 (Burns 1949).
91. IND. ANN. STAT. § 68-103 (Burns 1961).
92. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-301(17) (Burns 1950).
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purchase such access under their authority to buy land for a public park."
MAY ADMINISTRATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST IN PUBLIC WATERS
BE DELEGATED TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT?

In Wisconsin decisions about use of public waters that are matters
of statewide concern must be made by the state government itself, and a
delegation of such decisions to local government is an abdication of the
public trust and is void. 4 The Indiana court has not decided this question.
Some of the language found in Chapter 181 may lead the Indiana courts
to the Wisconsin conclusion. The statute vests the trust of control of
the lakes in the "state" and it gives the "state" the "full power and
control" of the public lakes. 5 The courts might decide this use of the
word "state" indicates that all policy decisions affecting public lakes
must be made at the state level. However, the approach the Indiana
legislature has taken to flood plain regulation casts doubt on such an
interpretation of Chapter 181. Construction on flood plains and construction of flood control works, activities closely related to public rights
in water since they affect the quality and beauty of the watercourses
on which the right may be exercised, are controlled at the state level
but enjoy significant participation by local government. Construction
of flood control projects is expected to be done largely by local government using local money subject only to general supervision by the state
Flood Control and Water Resources Commission." If the legislature
93. Ibid.
94. Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 515, 53 N.W.2d 514, rehearing,
55 N.W.2d 40, 46 (1952).
95. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-654 (Burns 1960).
96. The Flood Control Acts, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 27-1101-34 (Burns 1960), as
amended, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 27-1115, 17, 19, 20, 23a (Burns Supp. 1961) contemplate
solution of a problem of state-wide concern [flood damage and the diminishing of the
state's water resources-IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1102 (Burns 1960)] through cooperative
effort by federal, state and local government. The state contribution is the administration,
by the Flood Control and Water Resources Commission, of a permit system applicable
to all new construction activity in the floodways and to the maintenance of existing
artificial conditions as well. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1117 (Burns Supp. 1961). "Floodway" includes both the stream channel and the adjoining flood plain reasonably required
to carry the flood flow efficiently. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1103(2) (Burns 1960). The
Flood Control Commission in reviewing permit applications can impose such restrictions
on the permit as it deems necessary to carry out the purpose of the statute and in this
way can control both the design and the location of the structure or excavation. IND.
ANN. STAT. § 27-1117 (Burns Supp. 1961). This power seems to allow zoning of the
floodways at the state level. Since it applies to the maintenance of structures as well
as their creation, it affords a means of eliminating beauty-destroying structures on the
upland which also adversely affect or unduly restrict the capacity of the floodway.
The state also (through an additional permit system) coordinates the design, construction and operation of flood control works so as to affect the best possible flood
control throughout the state. IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1119 (Burns Supp. 1961). Although
the state has the power to build flood control structures, IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1115

RIGHTS IN INDIANA WATERS
considers local participation in a program of statewide concern essential,
it is hard to believe that it intended absolutely to bar local participation
in a related matter affecting the entire state. An additional statute or
judicial decision is needed to determine clearly the extent to which local
government may participate in shaping the substantive rights of public
use of lakes.
SUMMARY AND CRITICISM

Public rights to use water in Indiana are of statutory origin, except
for the rights of navigation and fishing. The statutory rights apply only
to lakes and do not apply to streams at all. Thus, even though streams
that are useful have been declared to be public water, only the narrow
rights of public use created by the Indiana Supreme Court exist on
streams.
The meaning of the Indiana statutes is clouded by their obscure
language. In addition, the statutes are of doubtful constitutionality.
Since no compensation to riparians situated on formerly private lakes
is provided for, the use rights given to nonriparians by making the lakes
public must be construed to flow from a police regulation. The regulation
in effect zones the lakes to public use rather than creating a property
right in nonriparians. The statutory language which vests only "power
and control" of the lakes rather than giving full title to the state supports
this conclusion. However, granting this interpretation, a difficult question remains under the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution.
Even if it is assumed that the statutes which appear to enlarge public
rights to use Indiana lakes are constitutional, the remaining situation is
not a particularly happy one for nonriparians desiring to use Indiana
waters. The writer knows of no administrative implementation of the
public rights declared in the statutes. A more serious fact to sportsmen
is simply that the enlarged rights are statutory in origin. As such they are
susceptible to relatively easy amendment-amendments which may inadvertently introduce changes in the law beyond that contemplated by
the legislature. Court made law, on the other hand, with the doctrine of

stare decisis behind it tends to resist changes, particularly changes
urged by pressure groups whose legitimacy is not derived from some
(Burns Supp. 1961), it does not do so. Instead it loans money to local governments
through the Flood Control Revolving Fund, IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 27-1124-34 (Burns
1960), so that they may build the structures. Under this technique local government
assumes a key roll in flood protection for the state. Although state agencies control
the projects in the sense of determining what projects to support, IND. ANN. STAT.
§27-1128 (Burns 1960), the local people determine what projects are proposed in the
first place, IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1127 (Burns 1960), and ultimately pay for them
with local money, IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-1132 (Burns 1960).
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basic social force demanding legal recognition and protection. The ancient
origin and continuous existence of public rights to use water for navigation and fishing," and the modem increase in leisure and in inclination
toward water recreation, 8 suggest that in contemporary society the
orderly use, by riparian and nonriparian alike, of all water courses suitable for recreation is itself a goal toward which important social forces
drive. Persons interested in achieving broad rights of public use of water
in Indiana may yet find it desirable or necessary to present a test case
to its courts.
In thinking of such a case attorneys should remember that the
Indiana Supreme Court has fashioned the court law of water rights along
lines it deemed best for the state's development as a whole and has remained
relatively uninfluenced by the English heritage of seemingly paramount
public over private rights in water. In Indiana, perhaps more than elsewhere, the protagonists in a test case of public rights in water may be
forced to rely on pragmatic proof of the utility to society of their respective positions. The result could be a more detailed exposition than
has yet been made of the costs and benefits, and of their distribution
through a community, of broad public rights to use water.
* This article is based in part on research done under a contract between the Uni-

versity of Wisconsin and the Economic Research Service, Farm Economics Division,
United States Department of Agriculture. The opinions expressed in the article are
solely those of the writer and are his responsibility.
97. See note 3 supra.
98. Waite, PleasureBoating in a Federal Union, 10 BunF. L. REv. 427 (1961).
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